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Abstract
The two Heisenberg Uncertainties entail an incompatibility between the two
pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two
kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p →
¬q) ∧ (q → ¬p) or defineable as [(p → ¬q) ∧ (q → ¬p)] ⇔ r. The former
kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact
independent, and thus ascertainable by virtue of logic, the latter fact depen-
dent, and thus ascertainable by virtue of fact. The two types are therefore
diametrically opposed.
In spite of this, however, the existing derivations of the Uncertainties are
shown here to entail both types of incompatibility simultaneously. ∆E∆t ≥
h, for example, is known to derive from the quantum relation E = hν plus
the Fourier relation ∆ν∆t ≃ 1. And the Fourier relation assignes a logical
incompatibility between a ∆ν = 0, ∆t = 0. (No frequency defineable at an
instant.) Which is therefore fact independent and unconditional. How can
one reconcile this with the fact that ∆E∆t if and only if h > 0, which latter
supposition is a factual truth, entailing that a ∆E = 0, ∆t = 0 incompatibility
should itself be fact dependent?
To then say that the incompatibility at hand is only logical, i.e. that resulting
from ∆ν∆t ≥ 1, is to treat ∆E = 0, ∆t = 0 as unconditionally incompatible,
since this is what their equivalents, ∆ν = 0, ∆t = 0 are, and therefore as
incompatible independently of the quantum. And to say that it is only factual,
amounts to disputing E = hν itself, whose presence alone is what necessitates
application of the -logical- relation ∆ν∆t ≥ 1. Since either option sacrifices an
equally essential requirement, it can only follow that this Uncertainty expresses
both a conditional and an unconditional form of incompatibility.
We continue by tracing the exact same phenomenon right within the heart
of the noncommutative formalism of QM. The fact dependent p,q noncommu-
tativity, expressed in pq 6= qp as derived from the relation pq − qp = i~I, has
given its place to the abstract Hilbertian, fact independent noncommutativity,
expressed in AB 6= BA, without explicit or implicit reference to ~. Hence, to
identify the two would lead to a contradiction comparable to the previous.
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1 Distinguishing Within Incompatibility
In a series of previous works one of us [1, 2, 3] has argued that the incompatibility of the
two pairs of conjugated variables, comprising the action products Et and pq, as manifested
in the two corresponding quantum uncertainties (UR here after), comes in two, antithetic
types, once because this is how theorists as a rule tend to argue (unfortunately), twice
because this is an option contained in the nature of incompatibility itself. Indeed, and
contrary to appearances or common opinion, Incompatibility as such is a twofold concept.
It is not too difficult to establish this in formal logic. The dichotomy can be immediately
seen (and felt) in the following way:
a. (p→ ¬q) ∧ (q → ¬p) however, also
b. [(p→ ¬q) ∧ (q → ¬p)]⇔ r.
These two expressions of Incompatibility are contradictory to one another. For the pos-
sible value ascription ¬r in [b] we will obtain “p and q”, a possibility which will never
come up within the contents of formula [a]. For ascription ¬r to [b], formulae [a] and
[b] immediately develop incompatible truth tables. This is because formula [a] expresses
unconditional incompatibility between p and q, while formula [b] only a conditional in-
compatibility between them, conditional, to be exact, on r. [b] reads: “p excludes q and
q excludes p if and only if r.” But not otherwise. Since the possibility that ¬r stands for
“otherwise”, for the ascription ¬r the two propositional variables, p and q, will cease to
be incompatible. But in formula [a] they never cease to be, come what may.
In other words, the incompatibility between the two propositional variables ex-
pressed in formula [b], as being conditional on the presence of an additional factor (r), is
one which obtains only in some cases. Namely, iff r. Since, however, the incompatibility
expressed in formula [a] is not conditional on anything, this latter obtains independently of
all other factors whatosoever and hence obtains for all possible cases instead. It therefore
(trivially) follows that no two pairs of concepts can be ever both, conditionally as well as
unconditionally incompatible for no two pairs of concepts can ever be both, incompatible
in all possible cases and also incompatible only in some.
The problem in QM is that, once this distinction is explicitly drawn as above
(which it never is), we frequently find ourselves oblidged to conclude that the classical
concepts, E with t and p with q, are indeed both. But of this later.
At present our task is to determine why and how -viz. under what specific condi-
tions Incompatibility presents itself in two antithetic ways. To put the point differently,
it may be clear to us how the concepts “one” and “many” may be incompatible to one
another. They are as a matter of definition. Hence, the incompatibility between “one”
and “many” is a straightforward matter of logic. And is therefore unexceptional. (Uncon-
ditional). But we have already seen in our definition that not all kinds of Incompatibility
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are unexceptional; that is to say, [b]. How then does the incompatibility expressed by [b]
come about?
Here is an example: I have a daughter and, besides, 10.000 dollars in the bank.
No problem there. But then my daughter is kidnapped and I receive a ransom note
for 10.000 dollars. I can no longer have both, my daughter and 10.000 dollars in the
bank. In view of the specific circumstances confronting me, a pair of hitherto compatible
situations have been rendered “mutually exclusive”, Bohr’s known term for inaugurating
his introduction to Complementarity (CTY hereafter). “Having one’s daughter” and
“having 10.000 dollars in the bank” are not incompatible states per se in the least. But
they can be made incompatible, provided that the right sort of suitable conditions are
introduced. In their face any two, hitherto compatible states (or concepts) can be rendered
incompatible, on condition that a suitable set of physical conditions are obtaining or
provisionally introduced, thereby forbidding their hitherto recorded mutual compatibility
for the entire duration of their presence. It goes without saying that, once the presence of
such conditions is removed, the two (temporarily) disjunctive states will become mutually
compatible once again in their usual, peaceful coexistence.
We have seen, therefore, that in the case of conditional incompatibility between a
pair of states (i.e. of incompatibility type [b]), it takes the intervention of an additional
fact, if it is to ever result. This we may entitle “the prohibitive fact”. ([2], p. 188). It
should be stressed that the “prohibitive” element in question is invariably and uniquely
an additional fact and nothing over and above a (mere) fact. And as such, unexpected
from a formal point of view. By contrast, unconditional incompatibility should never be
unexpected from a formal point of view, because it is a matter of logic. Not a matter
of fact which could, formally at least, have gone the other way. The two pairs of anti-
thetic clusters, “factual/conditional”-“logical/unconditional”, are therefore individually
coextensive, respectively.
Conditional incompatibility cannot result by virtue of the definitions of the (cur-
rently) incompatible pair of states (or pair of concepts). If it could, their incompatibility
would be logical and, as such, unexceptional; in other words, unconditional. It there-
fore follows that all instances of conditional incompatibility will invariably turn out to
be factual, whereas, by evident contrast, all instances of unconditional incompatibility
invariably logical. From this realization follows a further consequence, the importance of
which to the overall argument we can hardly overemphasize. The preceding considerations
have unequivocally established that unconditional incompatibility is self sufficient. By
contrast, once again, conditional incompatibility is never self sufficient. It invariably re-
quires an additional, prohibitive factor, capable of driving the two thus related states to
incompatibility, an incompatibility which otherwise -and in absence of the said factor -
would itself be impossible to result.
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The two formal (and exhaustive1) definitions of incompatibility previously spec-
ified, i. e. those of incompatibility type [a] and incompatibility type [b], succeed in
reflecting the property of Self-Sufficiency -or its absence- quite explicitly. In formula [a]
the incompatibility is confined to the two related variables, p and q, at the exclusion
of all other conditions, and we are forbidden to go looking beyond the two variables
per se for its establishment. In fact, to go looking beyond the two variables of relation
(p→ ¬q) ∧ (q → ¬p) for tracing or grounding their incompatibility is, quite simply, con-
tradictory to the assumption. If only to repeat the point, unconditional incompatibility
is (intolerantly) self sufficient.
In formula [b], however, the situation is altogether different. The biconditional
connective, ⇔, speaks for itself. The variables p and q will never in the context of for-
mula [b] enter a relation of mutual incompatibility without help from outside. p and q will
simply be compatible without such help, as can be seen immediately from assuming ¬r.
The outside help is withdrawn and the variables become compatible. Consequently, on
the whole, unconditional incompatibility is synonymous with self-sufficient incompatibility
and, accordingly, conditional incompatibility synonymous with self-insufficient incompat-
ibility. Emphasis on this provision, though it may seem pedantic to most readers at this
stage, is nonetheless well warranted and many quantum surprises will depend on it.
Now that the distinction between conditional and unconditional Incompatibility
has been defined and understood as above it is time to turn and ask the next, natural
question: Do the two quantum uncertainties, ∆E∆t ≥ h, ∆p∆q ≥ h express conditional
or do they express unconditional incompatibility between their two related sets of vari-
ables, E with t and p with q? In view of the preceding reasoning the answer to this
question is similarly natural. The reciprocal uncertainties in the values of the two pairs
of conjugated variables, E with t and p with q, as presently joined, obviously express
conditional incompatibility between these variables. Conditional (obviously) on h itself.
Clearly, for h = 0 both clusters of related uncertainties would vanish. On the other
hand, they do emerge for h > 0. Consequently, ∆E∆t, ∆p∆q are uncertainties which are
there because and only because of h. And would be removed in its absence. This reads,
respectively,
∆E∆t⇔ h > 0 and, accordingly, ∆p∆q ⇔ h > 0
which both precisely correspond to logical formula [b]. Evidently, then, the two UR
express conditional incompatibility between their related variables, conditional, that is,
on nothing other than h.
The interpretation thus suggested can then be integrated just as naturally as all the
other elements so far were in the following (natural) fashion: The two pairs of conjugate
classical variables, E and t, p and q, yielding the two action products Et and pq of the
1Exhaustive, that is to say, in Two-Valued Propositional Calculus.
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corresponding uncertainties, are rendered incompatible in QM because, simply, the latter
theory incorporates an additional fact, hitherto unacknowledged and unanticipated by
the classical theory, namely, action quantization, and it is the intervention of this precise
fact, absent in classical assumptions, which is responsible for the incompatiblity in the
joint determinations of E and/or t and p and/or q below its limit, h. The two sets
of incompatibilities are therefore fact dependent, that is to say, conditional on a fact ; h.
And therefore, trivially, express conditional incompatibility only. One of the most reliable
commentators in the field, C.A.Hooker, certainly seems to think so and not at all without
reason:
Bohr believes that while it has seemed to us at the macro-level of classical physics
that the conditions were in general satisfied for the joint applicability of all
classical concepts, we have discovered this century that this is not accurate and
that the conditions required for the applicability of some classical concepts are
actually incompatible with those required for the applicability of other classical
concepts. This is the burden of the doctrine (B4) [=CTY.]
This conclusion is necessitated by the discovery of the quantum of action and
only because of its existence. It is not therefore a purely conceptual discovery
that could have been made a priori through a more critical analysis of classical
concepts. It is a discovery of the factual absence of the conditions required
for the joint applicability of certain classical concepts.[[4] Dark letters for the
author’s italics.]
This, therefore, is exactly as foretold. The incompatibility above referred to is
factual, because it is not the product of concept analysis, disclosing a logical discrepancy
between the disjunctive concepts (and as such available a priori) and, therefore, as being
fact dependent, it is eo ipso conditional. Conditional, that is, on the fact itself upon
which it is dependent, and which we have previously labelled “the prohibitive fact”. In
other words, the quantum. Perhaps a fleeting allusion to the spontaneity of the author’s
account of the matter, its ‘naturaleness’ so to speak, would not be entirely out of place.
Spontaneity is important in this instance because it serves in crosschecking the two ac-
counts, ours, which is in conscious awareness of a contrast between these two types of
incompatibility, formally defined, and Hooker’s, which is rather intuitive and reflexive at
this stage2.
On the whole, therefore, at first it seems a safe bet that the two pairs of classical
variables of QM, when featuring pairwise in the two corresponding quantum uncertainties,
2And at a subsequent stage he has repudiated it altogether! Indeed, at a later time Hooker has actually expressed his
scepticism as concerns the viability of the distinction between logical and factual incompatibility as formulated by [2] or,
even, its usefulness as such. In his letter to Antonopoulos, dated 18 December 1989, he says that when it comes to “formal”
as opposed to “factual” aspects of the problem at hand “naturalists like me [him] cannot make a sharp distinction between
the two kinds of truth”. Well, up there he has! Not too consciously, it would appear, but nonetheless most definitely.
Which is all to the better, really, for, when not too much undue sophistication has come by just yet, to hold one captive to
wavering amphiboly, first thoughts are best thoughts.
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they should express conditional incompatibility between the thus related concepts and
nothing but that. On closer inspection, however, the situation appears a great deal more
complex than initially assumed. Closer inspection in fact reveals that, when analyzed and
examined all across the logico-mathematical board, the quantum uncertainties manifest
and force upon us an incompatibility which is both; conditional and unconditional for one
and the same pair of classical concepts.
Amazingly, the same phenomenon is noticeable, as we shall demonstrate later on,
right within the noncommutative formalism itself. To the fundamental, noncommutative
formalism inaugurated by the formula pq−qp = i~ there is now erected the noncommuta-
tive formalism of AB 6= BA. In other words, a noncommutativity without the quantum!
There is hardly ever a commentator who would not treat the two commutativities as
interchangeable, with the sole exception, in our knowledge, of Hilgevoord and Uffink [5].
But they are not really interchangeable at all. One is the mathematical consequence of
non-diagonal matrix multiplication, yielding noncommutativity by definition, the other a
noncommutativity due to ~. There’s a difference.
2 Applying the Distinction
2.1 Application to Wave-Particle Duality
The results of applying the Conditional vs Unconditional Incompatibility distinction to
quantum problems appear quite startling when viewed in this light. As a rule observed
by nearly all physicists, the quantum uncertainties and Wave-Particle Duality (WPD
hereafter) are treated as if intimately associated. And, indeed, there is a strong temptation
to associate them. According to this association a certain group of classical variables by
nature relate to the particle, their complementary variables by nature to the wave. But
particles are local entities, so particles are small. By contrast, waves are nonlocal entities,
so waves are large. And the opposition between large and small is logical, that is to say,
fact independent. Hence, waves and particles are self-sufficiently incompatible. This is
why, besides, waves and particles are incompatible also in classical mechanics. And
classical mechanics does not contain the quantum.
Well, then. If the two UR are a consequence of WPD, one set of variables belonging
to the wave, the other set to the particle, then, since waves (large) and particles (small)
exclude one another self-sufficiently, and hence without any help from the quantum, the
variables appearing in the two UR, as derived from WPD, would also exclude one another
self-sufficiently, and hence exclude one another without any help from the quantum. In
fact, they do not need any help from anything at all, except of course the self contained
opposition between “large” and “small” itself. Which opposition, as remarked, obtains
independently of the quantum. Consequently, either the two UR have nothing to do with
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WPD or else they have to do with WPD3, but then they have nothing to do with the
...quantum, on which, however, they are supposed to depend!
In other words, how can the incompatibility contained in WPD, which is self
sufficient enough to obtain full force even in classical mechanics, ever be responsible for
the incompatibility between the classical conjugate variables, which latter results only
on the basis of quantum assumptions? Or, to put the point differently, how can a fact
independent incompatibility, as that belonging to WPD, ever be responsible for a fact
dependent incompatibility, as that demanded by the two quantum uncertainties?
Some people still believe that WPD is the epitome of the quantum uncertain-
ties, if not indeed the epitome of QM as such. But once the Conditional/Unconditional
Incompatibility contrast is applied to it, it simply proves to be an incoherence. The un-
certainties, exactly as Hooker stressed, must absolutely depend on the quantum or be
nothing at all. But if the uncertainties are constructed upon the logical model afforded
by WPD, they will thereby express a self-sufficient type of incompatibility and, as we
have seen, such incompatibility -trivially- has no need of the quantum. To be precise,
cannot even make room for the quantum, except contradictorily. People think that WPD
furnishes the right sort of quantum incompatibility required by the UR. We have just
shown that it furnishes the wrong sort, if there ever was one.
2.2 Application to ∆E∆t ≥ h
But the real trouble does not lie in the comparison between an invalid derivation and a
-let us say- valid one. The invalid one can be discrarded at no cost. The real trouble
lies within the frame of the valid derivation itself. For that too is equally open to both
accounts, the conditional and the unconditional. Consider the Fourier reasoning applied
to the quantum relation E = hν. (See [5] and Bohr’s own work referred to there; for more
detail see Marmet, 1994, p.343; see, finally, [1])
Fourier’s known relation, ∆ν∆t ≥ 1
2pi
, was based on the observation that it is
a logical impossibility to determine the frequency at an instand dt = 0. Frequency is
by definition a repetitive phenomenon and hence by definition such as requires a time
latitude to be exemplified, if at all. Obviously, I cannot define the regular reoccurrence
of a certain event over even time intervals within a time dt = 0, i.e. a time so narrow
that won’t allow the event to occur even once. As D.M. Mackay has remarked almost
fifty years ago, the idea of defining a frequency at an instant dt→ 0 is self contradictory.
“This is not physics but logic”, he says [6].
Once the quantum relation, E = hν is (factually!) established, by simply substi-
tuting for ν = E
h
in Fourier’s above mentioned relation, we immediately obtain ∆E
h
∆t ≥ 1
2pi
and, finally, ∆E∆t ≥ h. Now, what sort of incompatibility does express, if derived in
3Which is what one of us has been insisting for two decades now; See [1] and, especially, [2].
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this way? Well, it should express precisely the sort of incompatibility which ν itself, the
frequency, does in Fourier’s relation. Are we not constantly reminded that “energy” is
the frequency in QM? Mackay, for instance, speaks of
the identification of energy with frequency [6].
and, in much more recent times, we are told in no uncertain terms that
This simple Planck relationship between energy and light frequency in effect says
that energy and frequency are the same thing, measured in different units [7].
A shorthand expression of the whole idea is the relation E ≈ ν, which says it all. So to
the task of specifying the syllogistic mechanism involved:
• Premise 1: Energy is logically equivalent with the frequency.
• Premise 2: Frequency is logically incompatible with an exact time.
• Conclusion: Hence, energy is logically incompatible with an exact time.
Here Conclusion follows from Premises 1 and 2 as trivially as the proverbial mor-
tality of Socrates follows from “All Men Are Mortal” and “Socrates Is A Man”. Attention
should be paid to the subordinate predicate, “logically”, modally conditioning the primary
predicate, “incompatible”. If Energy is coextensional with the Frequency, this predicate
must necessarily be included in the Conclusion, otherwise, and in its absence, the lat-
ter will not be validly drawn, contradicting their coextensionality. Hence, in the most
straightforward and valid of manners, energy is above shown to be logically incompatible
with an exact time, just as frequency previously was. But, as we have seen, concepts in-
compatible in this sense are self - sufficiently so. And concepts which are self - sufficiently
incompatible are concepts whose incompatibility is in fact independent. And therefore
such that cannot even relate to a fact, e.g. h. Hence, in accordance with the Fourier
treatment of the relation E = hν, we obtain an uncertainty ∆E∆t due to a fact, h, with
which it cannot even relate.
The reactions to this conclusion are not too difficult to foresee. Fortunately, we
have at our disposal something a good deal more substantial than mere foresight to get
our hands on, namely, an actual objection recently raised. It is the following:
I cannot share the author’s diagnosis. The energy - time uncertainty relation
can be derived from two premises: (1)E = hν (2)∆ν∆t ≥ 1. Here it is clear that
the second relation is the result of Fourier analysis, and therefore independent
of any physical assumption. The first however is clearly a non-trivial physical
assumption, that need not hold in physical theories other than QM. (1) and (2)
together imply ∆E∆t ≥ h (3). The diagnosis is simply this: since conclusion (3)
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depends on two premises, one of which is dependent upon a physical assumption,
the conclusion4 is dependent on this [physical] assumption too.5
And hence must be dependent on h. This is all so nice and cozy and so consonant with
quantum tradition that hardly anyone would resist the temptation of replying just thus, a
referee all the more so. However, it takes but one word to spoil it all, its hopes and plans
included, though not necessarily the fun as well: Substitution. Once this word is properly
attended to, this objection is exposed in all its circular and dogmatic incorrigibility.
What is the true essence of the entire Fourier derivation? It is, in a word, the
substitution of ν in ∆ν∆t ≥ 1 by E/h in order to derive ∆E∆t ≥ h. And in order
that one can be at all entitled to substitute E/h for ν one needs to presuppose that the
two of them, the substitute and the substituted, will just have to be identical, or equal,
or equivalent or what have you, provided they are so intimately linked as to license and,
indeed, entail the substitution. You name it, they have to be it. In consequence, E/h,
which replaces ν, the frequency, is the frequency, or else the substitution is illegitimate
and has no business being there in the first place. And then, since E/h is the frequency,
what is true of the frequency must be true of its substitute, E/h. And then, since what
is true of the frequency is that it is unconditionally incompatible with time, which this
referee openly concedes, E/h is also unconditionally incompatible with time, which he
inconsistently does not. It is either that or else the substitution is sheer bogus and no
∆E∆t ≥ h of any kind will result, coherent or otherwise.
By right of mathematical law, the law of substitutions, E/h(= ν) is uncondition-
ally incompatible with time, even if it deceitfully contains h in the denominator of the
fraction just to mislead(some of) us. The conclusion can now be denied at the pain of
contradiction. By inserting E/h in the place of ν in ∆ν∆t ≥ 1, we commit ourselves
to making E/h whatever ν is, thus deriving a logical uncertainty and, therefore, a fact
independent one that cannot even relate to this very h, which it has itself put there! In
the face of our distinction the Fourier tratment of E = hν leads to incoherence and absur-
dity comparable to that of WPD previously encountered(essentially it is the same exact
problem), if not indeed to a worse kind. Valid reasoning is reasoning which transmits the
logical properties of the premises down to the last conclusion. And the logical properties
of premise ∆ν∆t ≥ 1 is that it incorporates a self - sufficient type of incompatibility,
which renders h redundant.
4The conclusion should be dependent on this physical assumption, h or E = hν, says the author of the passage, correcting
us. But we have never denied that it depends on this assumption. Anything but. We have only raised the question, whether
the physical assumption referred to RETAINS ITS IDENTITY. We have never denied whether E = hν is a premise to the
argument. This is precisely what we have stressed. We have only questioned the NATURE of this premise and whether
the CONTEXT of the argument, imposing the logical relation ∆ν∆t ≥ 1, allows it to reatin its original logical properties
or whether it retrodictively cancels them,given the overall pressures of the said context.
5Extract from a report on a previous version of this paper, dated 4th November 2003. Italics, brackets and initial ours.
The report was written for Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics and is at the disposal of the Editor
of.
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The essence of the problem here encountered stems from the fact that, in view of
the distinction here introduced (and hitherto absent in all quantum theorizing), E = hν
proves a full scale logical hybrid. Initially, E = hν states a factual truth -a startling one
at that- so whatever E, t incompatibility is subsequently destined to result on its basis,
it should only be fact-dependent in this particular context. However, what this (unique)
factual truth reveals right after is, that the concept which is (factually) equivalent with
E, i.e. the frequency, ν, is itself logically incompatible with an exact t, thereby rendering
the thus resulting E, t incompatibility a fact independent one, in this other context.
Given the surrounding, ‘outer’ context, i.e. the factualness of E = hν, E and t must
be conditionally incompatible. But given the surrounded, ‘inner’ context, i.e. the logical
incompatibility between a ∆ν = 0 with a ∆t = 0, E and t must now be unconditionally
incompatible.
When, in other words, E = hν is considered in its (outward) relation to reality,
it must in this capacity be a factual truth. But when considered in itself (inwardly),
in this other capacity it incorporates a logical truth. What should we say then? That
what E = hν really asserts is that, on its basis, E and t are unconditionally incompatible
concepts on condition that E = hν is true? On the basis of the distinction here
introduced this is exactly what we have to say. Though, of course, in its absence, we
wouldn’t have to.
3 The hybrid nature of Quantum Mechanical Formalism
In Heisenberg’s paper of 1925[8] there is mentioned a type of multiplication between
the quantities characteristic of a quantum system directly leading to relations of non-
commutativity between them. Such multiplication was subsequently identified by Born
and Jordan[9] as a multiplication of matrices corresponding to the physical quantities
attributable to a quantum system. This was the inauguration of transformation the-
ory which in turn developed into the widely disseminated axiomatic foundation of von
Neumann’s[10].
In the following pages of the present essay we shall attempt to classify Heisenberg’s
quantum multiplication -this is how it will be referred to from now on so that it will be
distinguished from matrix multiplication as such-, the multiplication of matrices and their
concomitant noncommutativities, and finally the resulting uncertainties, on the basis of
the distinction established in the first part of the paper. In particular, the relations
mentioned in Heisenberg’s paper are satisfied by physical systems on condition that
action is quantized and on that condition alone. By contrast, the mathematical
treatment, which was initiated by Born and Jordan, constitutes a “hybrid” for the
second time running, because the premises of this latter hypothesis may lead to the
noncommutative relation pq − qp 6= 0 for the variables p,q, but the specific relation
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pq− qp = i~I6 is not intrinscically derivable from within it. It is extrinscically introduced
on the basis of further assumptions.
In other words, the latter noncommutativity is inherent in advance within the
chosen formalism, as a self-subsisting mathematical property, contrary to Heisenberg’s
multiplication, which is factually dependent on the quantum and cannot result in its
absence. Whereupon, the noncommutativity in question must become system-specific in
order to be applied to the relevant phenomena.
Commencing, Heisenberg dennounces the classical picture of an electron’s kine-
matics and proceeds to the adoption of a different interpretation of the function x(t)
whose classical interpretation would be the particle’s position in the space of intuition.
In a parallel course, however, considering the correspondence principle, he retains the dif-
ferential equation which governs the said function (Newton’s second law) in the classical
treatment. Thus he accepts that the equation x¨(t) + f(x) = 0 regulates the connection
of x(t) with the outwardly exerted force f(x).
In what follows he analyzes x(t) in “Fourier” fashion, so that the resulting ex-
pression will harmonize itself with the quantum conditions. In the classical case, if
ν(n, a) is the frequency observed during the transition from state n to state a, then
ν(n, a) = a
~
dW (n)
dn
(1) Where W (n) is the energy of the said state. By contrast, due
to the presence of discontinuous states in the quantum case, the frequency during the
transition from state W (n) to state W (n − a) is characterized by emission of radiation
ν(n, n − a) = W (n)−W (n−a)
~
(2). Suppose then that x(n, t) is x(t) in the specific case
that the electron is in the state W (n). Then, classically, x(n, t) would be expanded
as
∫ +∞
−∞
Ua(n)e
iω(n)atda(3), where Ua(n) is now a complex quantity, i.e. the transition
amplitude, whose squared measure furnishes the probability that an electron will pass
from state W (n) to state W (a). Quantum mechanically, x(n, t) is expanded into a series∑+∞
a=−∞ U(n, n − a)e
iω(n,n−a)t(4)7, where U(n, n − a) plays a part analogous with Ua(n)
and ω(n, n−a) = 2piν(n, n−a). Then in accordance with the form assumed by f(x) there
are obtained retrodictive formulae for the quantities A(n, n − a) and ω(n, n− a), where
A(n, n− a) = Re{U(n, n− a)}, introducing the expansion into the differential equation.
Consider then two quantities
α(t) =
∑+∞
a=−∞ U(n, n−a)e
iω(n,n−a)t, β(t) =
∑+∞
a=−∞ V (n, n−a)e
iω(n,n−a)t. Then α(t)β(t) =∑+∞
b=−∞ Z1(n, n− b)e
iω(n,n−b)t and
β(t)α(t) =
∑+∞
b=−∞ Z2(n, n− b)e
iω(n,n−b)t,
where Z1(n, n − b) =
∑+∞
a=−∞ U(n, n − a)V (n − a, n − b)e
iω(n,n−b)t and Z2(n, n − b) =∑+∞
a=−∞ V (n, n− a)U(n− a, n− b)e
iω(n,n−b)t.
Whereupon, in general, we obtain α(t)β(t)−β(t)α(t) 6= 0. That is to say, the mul-
tiplication of the two quantities ceases being commutative. And this noncommutativity
6This formula is refered to as canonical commutation relation. In [8] there is only a specific form of this relation.
7With the assumption that the system is periodic or multiperiodic. Else the series has to be replaced by the integral∫ +∞
−∞
Ua(n)eiω(n,n−a)tda without any essential change in the foregoing argument.
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exists by virtue of the quantum of action. Were it not for the quantum, we would not
have observed a discontinuous and countable sequence of states, starting from the ground
state. In consequence, it would not be formula of minuses nr.(2), which would then obtain,
but nr.(1). But then, as can be verified by a single calculation, α(t)β(t)− β(t)α(t) = 0.
This result is directly specified for the magnitudes x(t), of position, and p = mx˙(t), of
momentum.
We conclude by contending that the noncommutative quantum multiplication here
obtained is satisfied only on the basis that h > 0 and would reduce to ordinary, commu-
tative multiplication, were the limitation h > 0 to be withdrawn. As will soon become
evident this is no longer true for transformation theory and, by extension, for von Neu-
mann’s axiomatization. Noncommutativity is still there but it is now of a different type,
resulting as a self contained property of the mathematical scheme employed. And which
is therefore unconditionally true, i.e. such that obtains independently of h. To compen-
sate for this, it then has to be remodified in order to accord itself with the phenomenon
investigated, and thus it is inconsistently reshaped into a noncommutativity by virtue of
facts on top of the previous. This may not suffice to condemn all parts of the formalism,
but it can be a severe problem.
Commencing their treatment Born and Jordan assume that the conjugate dynam-
ical variables of the system under investigation, p,q, constitute hermitian matrices of the
form p = (p(nm)eiω(nm)t) and q = (q(nm)eiω(nm)t), where m,n ∈ N, ω(nm) = ω(n,m) =
2piW (n)−W (m)
~
in Heisenberg’s symbolism and q(nm), p(nm) ∈ C generally. Due to this
the products pq and qp are considered to be the products of a pair of matrices. It is
commonplace knowledge that matrix multiplication is the archetype of noncommutative
multiplication in Mathematics. Therefore, generally pq−qp 6= 0 (5) without the quantum
playing a part in this effect. What is more, it is shown next in the work referred to that
the relation pq − qp = i~I, where I is the identity matrix, by means of Bohr’s quantum
formula J =
∫ 1
ν
0
pdq = nh. It is more than evident that this last formula constitutes the
premise, so as to make matrix mechanics agree with the phenomenon, which in Heisen-
berg’s argument has perfectly sufficed for deriving the quantal multiplication without any
external help. The authors of the paper themselves remark that relation (5) constitutes a
direct statement of the correspondence principle. That is to say, when ~→ 0, pq−qp→ 0,
and the quantities become commutative. However, this statement is misleading.
It is true that pq − qp → 0, when ~ → 0, but this “0” is the zero matrix and not
the zero of real numbers. If that relation constituted a genuine statement of the corre-
spondence principle, p and q would in the end turn out real numbers, and this is not what
happens. Quite simply, from noncommutative matrices they turn into commutative ones.
This will not of course degenerate all the eigenvalues of each and every matrix into one,
and so the quantum fluctuations will remain invariant. The difference is that the conju-
gate variables coevolve without excluding one another. Although the two multiplications,
the quantal and the matrix, display the same formal attitude, this will not coerce their
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referents to become identical.
By contrast, in Heisenberg’s reasoning, when ~→ 0, the “Fourier” series assumes
a classical expansion, since we can now differentiate by using formula (1) and the two
quantities turn out to be real numbers. In this way, while the two multiplications, the
quantal and the matrix, manifest the same outward effects, the mathematical objects
which each one refers are quite distinct.
And it is at this point that the inconsistent deviation from Heisenberg’s multi-
plication is inaugurated. Conflating the two cases, as we have seen it done before (1st
Part) Born, Jordan and von Neumann proceed on the supposition that the two noncom-
mutativities were analogous or identical and, hence, that the two formalisms were. But
they are not. For while in Heisenberg’s multiplication, on the assumption that “h = 0”
noncommutativity is eliminated, in the case of [9] where a zero matrix is obtained in-
stead, noncommutativity is not. It just assumes a different look by putting on a mask,
yet without ever departing from its authentic identity.
On our understanding of the matter, the problem is rather simple to state though
not necessarily simple to solve. The noncommutativity in Heisenberg’s multiplication is
eliminable in principle because it is conditional on the quantum, hence removable in its
absence, but the noncommutativity of Born, Jordan and von Neumann is ineliminable
in principle, because it is self subsisting. It is a fact-independent noncommutativity and
therefore ineliminable come what may. It is a noncommutativity ascertainable in advance,
a clear cut mathematical phenomenon the residues of which stay on in one form or another,
once this mathematics is employed. Not being conditional on anything except its own self
it therefore continues to tacitly obtain even when the quantum is removed, yielding for
classical expectations a zero matrix only, instead of zero just, bearing witness to its own
fact-independent origin.
Consequently, it will either be consistently regarded in its pure mathematical
essence, whereupon however it cannot even relate to the quantum, or else incorporate
Heisenberg’s conditional noncommutativity, if to be at all able to apply to specific quan-
tum problems, but then do so at the price of an antinomy. The very antinomy detected
in our first part of the argument, where the logical ∆ν∆t ≥ 1 is turned into the factual
∆E∆t ≥ h, when the empirical relation E = hν is introduced. Yielding in both instances
the same logical hybrid.
Before we conclude we wish to make explicit the situation in von Neumann’s
abstract axiomatization8. Let us list the axioms in this approach:
1. To each quantum system there corresponds a complex separable Hilbert space (H, 〈·, ·〉)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product. Every ψ ∈ H with ||ψ|| =
√
〈ψ, ψ〉 = 1 corresponds
8We shall study autonomous(isolated) systems. So the Hamiltonian is time-independent and corresponds to the totel
energy of the system
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to a state of the system. By equivalence, the projectile space PH = {[ψ] : (ψ ∈
H) ∧ (||ψ|| = 1)} constitutes the set of the states of the system.
2. The observables of the system in question are symmetrical operators of space (H, 〈·, ·〉)
that is to say, observable A is represented by a linear operator A such that 〈Aφ, ψ〉 =
〈φ,Aψ〉, ∀φ, ψ ∈ H. The values of the observable A are the spectrum of the corre-
sponding symmetrical operator, σ(A) = {λ ∈ C : A− λIdH is singular}
9, where IdH
is the identity mapping. The mean value of the observable, E(A), is given by the
corresponing spectral measure, E(A) = 〈ψ,Aψ〉, where ψ the state of the system.
3. The Hamiltonian of the system, H , constitutes an observable and its corresponding
operator is self-adjoint. In Heisenberg’s representation, if A is an observable, then its
temporal evolution is determined by the equation A˙ = i
~
[H,A], where [H,A] = HA−
AH is the commutator of H and A. In Schroedinger’s picture, when the system is in
state ψ(t0) at the time t0, it is in the state ψ(t) = exp(−
i
~
H(t− t0))ψ(t0)
10(formally
the Schroedinger equation is then written as i~∂ψ
∂t
= Hψ). In every one of the
cases the Hamiltonian constitutes an infinitesimal generator of the evolution of the
dynamical quantities.
The first two axioms introduce a self-contained noncommutativity, since the observables
are represented as symmetric operators in a Hilbert space. The sole case, when the
symmetric operators always commute, is that of a one-dimensional Hilbert space, that is
to say H = C. But then the system should have only one state which could occupy. It
is evident why we can’t accept this strongly artificial situation. If we demand, however,
of the quantities of momentum and position to fulfill the normal rules of commutativity,
the resulting space must now be one of infinite diamensionality, as Born and Jordan
themselves remark. (To be precise, the operators of momentumn and position cannot be
bounded [12, 13], and this is why in the foregoing axioms we speak of symmetric rather
than of self-adjoint operators.)
Consequently, noncommutativity is in this case inherent within the axiomatic sys-
tem a priori, as is inherent in the statetement, “If X > 10, then X > 5”, the statement
that “then X > 6”. Which latter is a trivial consequence of the previous, hypothetical
statement. Similarly the noncommutativity in question is a tautological consequence of
the axioms 1 and 2 and has nothing to do with the quantum of action. Further ahead,
in the third axiom the quantum emerges in the evolution equation of each picture. This,
however, constitutes a further introduction for settling the matter, exactly as it has in
the papers of Born and Jordan, and that of Born, Jordan and Heisenberg which followed.
Operating within the frame of von Neumann’s axiomatization we can demonstrate
Robertson’s general uncertainty relation: Let A,B be two observables. Then the inequality
9Cause of the operator’s symmetry the spectrum is a subset of the real numbers
10We ‘ve used here the Stone theorem, see [11]
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(V ar(A)V ar(B))
1
2 ≥ 1
2
|E([A,B])| obtains, where V ar(A) the variance of A, V ar(A) =
E((A− E(A))2)(the same for V ar(B)).
This inequality is also self-sufficient and obtains without mediation of the quantum.
If we consider the relation [p, q] = i~IdH for position and its conjugated momentum then
(V ar(p)V ar(q))
1
2 ≥ ~
2
or equivalent ∆p∆q ≥ ~
2
, if ∆A =
√
V ar(A) is the uncertainty
dispersion of quantity A, that is to say, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation for momentum
and position. But this uncertainty should be dependent on the quantum and still its
derivation, down to its terminal conclusion, has been quite possible without it.
We therefore notice that although Robertson’s inequality reflects a self-sufficient
noncummutativity and hence independent of h, by introducing further premises, we end
up with a hybrid noncommutativity, due to and not due to h in the end. In other words
an uncertainty relation that is fact dependent and fact independent at the same time.
Higevoord and Uffing argue[5] that Robertson’s inequaltity presents problems additional
to the one we have detected.
In concluding we contend that the mathematical formalism has since 1925 been
tracking a most mysterious and confusing path. On the one hand it imposes upon the
physical magnitudes involved noncommutativities warranted a priori, and hence such as
were true in advance of the factual discovery that h > 0, and on the other hand introduces
a different kind of noncommutativity altogether, in order to force the former to come to
agreement with the physical content it purports to reflect. We are not pursuing the deeper
causes or motives behind this contradictory tendency but we do believe that steps towards
its amendment should be taken, so that the formalism may maintain its applicability and
at the same time restore the authenticity of the physical ideas which have given rise to it.
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